FEDERALIST No. 1
General Introduction
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, October 27, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its
own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the
existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it
is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting
in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in
the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be
regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good
men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be
directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and
unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this
is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The
plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests,
innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its
discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,
passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest
of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may
hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the
offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted
ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize
themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of
the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under
one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature.
I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their
situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious
views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated
by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the
opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its
appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable -- the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived
jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes
which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many
occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right
side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,
if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who
are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be
drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their
antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,
and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate
as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a
question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing
could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all
times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion,
it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all
former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and
malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually
hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the
number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the
bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and
efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.
An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which
is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity
at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one
hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble
enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and
illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that
the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that,
in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their
interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more
often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the
people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and
efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been
found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the
latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of
republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending
tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,
from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the
utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which
may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same
time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed
from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my
countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive
consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.
I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your
dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel.
I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have
decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely
lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness
of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my
own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by
all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace
the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A
GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE
ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO
THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN
STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS
ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT,
TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts
of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it
whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine will,
in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough
to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to
those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the
alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of
the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers,
to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall
accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS
1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held
out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.
____
FEDERALIST No. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, October 31, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the
most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their
taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will
be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,
and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is
instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in
order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of
consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest
of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be
one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide
themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national
government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest
citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians
now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead
of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a
division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has
its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it
formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or
inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and
declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the
people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully
convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one
connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western
sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a
variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable
streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A
succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders,
as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world,
running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy
communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and
exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people --
a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and
independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so
proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial,
jealous, and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly
been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made
peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a
nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into
various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people,
at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve
and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political
existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when
many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility
and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and
reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and
wellbalanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at,
that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on
experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it
was intended to answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for both
could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as
with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take
that important subject under consideration.
This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts
of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with
minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool,
uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been
awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their
country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced
by their joint and very unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to
BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and
candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject
demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was
remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished
than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on
a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is
not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger
induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774.
That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the
event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the
press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very
measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the
dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of
consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose
ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good,
were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the
advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and
deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided
judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the
country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety
of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed
together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their
country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head.
That they were individually interested in the public liberty and
prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than
their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature
deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.
These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly
on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their
advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter
them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the
men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally
known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and
advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most
distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and
justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in
acquiring political information, were also members of this convention,
and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.
It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with
the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its
Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people
in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan
which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety,
therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular
period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or
why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better
than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always
thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform
attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons,
which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.
They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct
confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to
foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union
in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen,
that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have
reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL
TO ALL MY GREATNESS."
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 3
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 3, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect
for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and
uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly
united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear
to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that
they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary
to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to
be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great
variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords
great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and
comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising
from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is
proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this
remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes
of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America;
for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the
fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to
preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties
with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,
are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also
extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect
to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to
attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more
general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice,
and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon
in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration,
the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national
government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to
other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense and executed in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local laws
and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be
preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able,
if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the
aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those
local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its
commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of
treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are
less to be apprehended under one general government than under several
lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of
the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort
than can be derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of
the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several
instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper
conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to
restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of
many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be
those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of
apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to
excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate
that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not
be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately
interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly
than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men,
naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their
acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The
national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride,
but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on
the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which
threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State
or confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,
or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE,
to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to
it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded
or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any
other POWERFUL nation?
PUBLIUS
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FEDERALIST No. 4
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 7, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to
by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show
that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be
more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the
State governments or the proposed little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN
force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to
other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in
such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not
be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when
their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects
merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal
affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their
particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives,
which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in
wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.
But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent
in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are
others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding
any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign
fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our
carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing
theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to
restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities
which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of
our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the
advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes
or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor
will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and
us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with
prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they
should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land
and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of
these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present,
and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for
operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.
Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government
as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation
consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends
on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us
inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in
question, more competent than any other given number whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be
found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of
treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular
interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply
the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular
part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or
separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of
system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by
putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief
Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and
thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into
three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of
Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at
all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the
enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one
national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as
to make it a nursery for seamen -- if one national government had not
called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets,
their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let
England have its navigation and fleet -- let Scotland have its
navigation and fleet -- let Wales have its navigation and fleet -- let
Ireland have its navigation and fleet -- let those four of the
constituent parts of the British empire be be under four independent
governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle
into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments -- what
armies could they raise and pay -- what fleets could they ever hope to
have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend
their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their
being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by
a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity
and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have
been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished?
Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be
natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries,
abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so
often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and
money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which
of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of
peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and
compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be
inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over
the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers
and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments,
and conduce far more to the safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it
is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and
they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national
government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently
regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources
and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people
free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to
cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other
hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each
State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or
split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics
or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three,
what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable
would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and
how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or
family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 5
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 10, 1787
JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then
forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and
perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will
secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities
amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two
kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this
union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all
apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS
ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in
this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy
conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and
future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies,
who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO
PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more
to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the
best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by
their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although
it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island
should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided
into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest
with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the
arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were
far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and
assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined
in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests,"
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and
the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general
interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be
either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant
apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at
first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance
can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local
circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to
impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that
superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the
government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality
in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be
presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight
would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long
succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the
scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors,
that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.
Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote,
whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also
restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her
prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern
these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose
confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally
unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing
is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious
jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably
more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become
evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and
sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did
in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash
conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey
in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more
delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be
borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on
the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries;
in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which
some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH
OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination
and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to
put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign
enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces
against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT
NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities
are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties
be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it
might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the
SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the
NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and
friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would
not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and
fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these
confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to
guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us
not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our
ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or
compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others make
in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under the
same character introduce into the governments of those whom they
pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us
against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 14, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of
disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed
to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming
kind -- those which will in all probability flow from dissensions
between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and
convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly
anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full
investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united
in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To
presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their
existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and
rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of
independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would
be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at
defiance the accumulated experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some
which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective
bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the
desire of pre-eminence and dominion -- the jealousy of power, or the
desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more
circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their
spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between
commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either
of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in
the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this
class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many
instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext
of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national
tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,[1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,[2] another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the
statuary Phidias,[3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be
brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the
purchase of popularity,[4] or from a combination of all these causes,
was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in
the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after
various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the
ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,[5] entertained
hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the
influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of
this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a
war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the
hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which
he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever
was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal
monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was
at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,[6] the petulance of
another,[7] and the cabals of a third,[8] had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,
are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally
known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will
not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the
reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending
to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a
case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a
DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would
have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who
stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the
States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of
republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors
which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours,
will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with
each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate
a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of
all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If
this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not,
on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and
immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human
conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or
justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than
monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the
latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires
of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not
popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,
resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent
propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often
governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of
course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the
objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as
many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the
prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity
of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one
and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human
opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies
of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp;
and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into
the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn,
gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a
conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,
till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II.
found means to accomplish that formidable league,[9] which gave a deadly
blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,
took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had
furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were
among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis
XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose
one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the
predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have
been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom
has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal
wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs
into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and
sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable
struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and
BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the
antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the ambition,
or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,[10] protracted the war beyond
the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in
opposition to the views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations, -- the desire of supplanting and
the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic
or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even
the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations
without their consent.
The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of
the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish
main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on
the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which
were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just
retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the
English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the
mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment,
the innocent were, after a while, confounded with the guilty in
indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a
violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the
House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry.
Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its
consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before
had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial
fruits.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason
can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough
of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused
us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and
evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from
the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim
for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other
inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and
credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and
ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State
of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and
the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare -- !
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord
and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has
from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom
in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations
natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject
to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of
each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences
that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which
disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
neighbors."[11] This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and
suggests the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS
1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the
connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France,
the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably.
____
FEDERALIST No. 7
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
For the Independent Journal.
Thursday, November 15, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements
could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It
would be a full answer to this question to say -- precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the
nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of
a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our
immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the
restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience
to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those
restraints were removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most
fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest
proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this
origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast
tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.
There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them,
and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar
claims between them all. It is well known that they have heretofore had
serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which
were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went
under the name of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose
colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their
property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this
article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the
Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the
submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction
of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of
peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the
Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent
policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the
States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the
whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the
Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the
dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this
dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a
large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if
not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that
were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of
federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had
ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no
doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument
would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the
justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint
efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to
probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a
right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty
to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different
principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as
they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not
easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would
sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The
circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in
expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of
confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision
of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in
favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of
dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be
entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something
like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have
sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure
on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to
have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals,
acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions
which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and
the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as
well from States not interested as from those which were interested in
the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the
Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert
its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one,
a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest
of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had
obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district.
Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours,
seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their
own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered
a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed
by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered
deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an
unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of
these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely
to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of
escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in
the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or
separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy
peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and
exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on
the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since
the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to
those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of
this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE
THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise,
which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion
of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this
unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by
which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to
their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side,
the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally
lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New
York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind.
New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her
importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the
inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what
we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this
advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them
should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would
it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to
distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New
Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?
Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed
enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an
advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so
oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent
weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of
New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will
answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the
first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be
alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to
agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is
scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real
objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse
interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the
States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some
of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit,
or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the
question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of
the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the
difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose
citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in
the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some
equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former
would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule
would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and
affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamour;
foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands,
and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency
of external invasion and internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would
naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as
naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an
increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible
a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not
to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with
their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and
altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the
equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part
of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes --
the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances;
accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in
addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with
money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced
them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies,
from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,
and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the
tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions
for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident
benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is
nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on
the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be
considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not
authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would
preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if
unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in
too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the
disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the
enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we
reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a
war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States
or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this
situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded
in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part
of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not
connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league,
offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of
European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the
parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to
the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them
all. Divide et impera[1] must be the motto of every nation that either
hates or fears us.[2]
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as
possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four
times a week -- on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the
Daily Advertiser.
____
FEDERALIST No. 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States,
in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each
other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not
united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some
of the consequences that would attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in
those countries where regular military establishments have long
obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of
Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy,
have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of
rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid
desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their
introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.
The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places,
which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two
or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.
Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and
delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would
penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as
intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively
small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid
of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises
of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of
the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and
little acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of
military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The
want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to
another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with
little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests
would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore,
would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in
the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the
principal figure in the events which would characterize our military
exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life
and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant
on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to
liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe,
they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it
is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is
therefore inferred that they may exist under it.[1] Their existence,
however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,
problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,
must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant
preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or
confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon
an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and
effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by
fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the
legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or
confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous
governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often
triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,
which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the
safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them
long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They
would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been
effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we
should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country
the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old
World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our
reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are
solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of
human affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver
and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the
offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have
produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered
disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the
inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The
rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely,
if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in
no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not
accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil
state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the
principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army
renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and
the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the
soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may
be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it
will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of
the great body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be
always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for
instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of
the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as
their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is
very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make
a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military
power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An
insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure
against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of
a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head
against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and
embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national
policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger
number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a
long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which
have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar
felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve
the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the
prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been
situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have
been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home
coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like
them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute
power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the people
of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by
the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any
dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this
position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,
and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most
probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we
should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the
continental powers of Europe -- our liberties would be a prey to the
means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each
other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and
honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and
trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with
trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in
all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that
flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries
would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real,
certain, and formidable.
PUBLIUS
1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it
will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been
taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to
be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America,
most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.
____
FEDERALIST No. 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 21, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of
the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It
is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the
distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid
succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of
perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to
the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of
felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising
from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be
overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If
momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us
with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish
us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction
and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments
for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly
celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms
of republican government, but against the very principles of civil
liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the
order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation
over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics
reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in
a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust,
America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not
less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their
errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which
they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised
models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty
would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of
government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most
other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various
principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all,
or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power
into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their
offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new
discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in
modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the
excellences of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I
shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on
a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such
systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single
State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great
Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object
under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the
principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended
to in another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard
the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force
and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon
in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the
most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the
plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the
observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory
for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of
the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work,
nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they
subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards
he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost
every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms
of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point
as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either
of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting
ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous
commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the
miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who
have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been
aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the
division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated
policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of
petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to
extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue,
but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of
America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as
has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that,
in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon
the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the
true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to
a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a
confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of
popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.
"It is very probable," (says he[1]) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of
a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES
agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It
is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable
of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a
degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united
body."
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this
society prevents all manner of inconveniences."
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this
would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still
remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he
had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his
usurpation."
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they
are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on
one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and
the confederates preserve their sovereignty."
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation,
it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of
large monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in
favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions
which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to
make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more
immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of
the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its
authority to the members in their collective capacities, without
reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended
that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of
internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the
members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;
they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the
manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions
to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that
there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown
in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder
and imbecility in the government.
The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into
one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a
constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would
still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a
confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the
Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The
COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of
the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of
interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing
that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is
the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this
association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the
distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this
enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the
novel refinements of an erroneous theory.
PUBLIUS
1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
____
FEDERALIST No. 10
The Same Subject Continued
(The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Insurrection)
From the Daily Advertiser.
Thursday, November 22, 1787.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never
finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he
contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the
principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The
instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the
favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty
derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made
by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an
unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually
obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints
are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,
equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures
are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the
rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not
permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found,
indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses
under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of
our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other
causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and,
particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public
engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end
of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly,
effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit
has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one,
by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the
other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions,
and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was
worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an
aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less
folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because
it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air,
which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its
destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise.
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to
exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions
and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the
former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The
diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of
interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of
property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of
the society into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or
to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to
the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their
common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the
most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle
their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are
without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those
who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like
discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit
to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the
most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations,
not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the
rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes
of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they
determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question
to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the
other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties
are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party,
or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to
prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree,
by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be
differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and
probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good.
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an
act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is,
perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation
are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice.
Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public
good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view
indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the
immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights
of another or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse
the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence
under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a
faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it
to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and
the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private
rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the
great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is
the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at
the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent
passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local
situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on
as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice
and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to
the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy
becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure
for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in
almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication
and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is
nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have
in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of
government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a
perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same
time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their
opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the
cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it
varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of
the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be
extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for
the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of
factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by
intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,
and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is,
whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election
of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in
favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number,
in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large
it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard
against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of
representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the
two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small
republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not
less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages
of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who
possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established
characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a
mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By
enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances
and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly
attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and
national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in
this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the
national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and
extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of
republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance
principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in
the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act
in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked
that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,
communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number
whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a
large over a small republic, -- is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render
them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not
be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to
possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater
security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of
any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal
degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union,
increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes
of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the
Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a
political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils
against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an
abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other
improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body
of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as
such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district,
than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican
government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in
being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and
supporting the character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 11
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 24, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those
points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of
opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of
men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to
our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has
already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of
Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in
that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the
foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in
America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with
painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their
American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the
dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation
of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate
the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far
as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer
the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their
navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping
the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not
prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by
facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,
at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries
to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This
assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate
the importance of the markets of three millions of people -- increasing
in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to
agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so -- to any
manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the
trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in
its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns,
to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for
instance, we had a government in America, capable of excluding Great
Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all
our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her
politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect
of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive
kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been
asked, upon other occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a
solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that prohibitions on our
part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could
prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would
be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were
wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be
materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her
own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits
be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and
risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable
deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the
competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British
commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the
management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a
state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of
the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of
the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present
system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets
of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most
substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British government,
and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and
immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent
effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see
themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a
federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union
under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not
very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of
the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if
thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be
more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies. A
few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either
side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the
event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our
position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this
consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this
country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies,
it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable
us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price
would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a
steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the
arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of
European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may
dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that
the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and
would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly
placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would
be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each
other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or
remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as
it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected
when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its
weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources
of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the
combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation
would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an
impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive
navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of
moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the
little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable
course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the
conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common
interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our
becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our
navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine
us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content
ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the
profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and p
rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the
genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself
an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and
poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,
might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are
rights of the Union -- I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of
the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of
the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the
future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful
partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition
of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and
Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the
utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain
long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown
us to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we
are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more
natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such
dangerous competitors?
This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.
All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously
participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of
mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of
seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the
principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal
resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.
To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the
quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and
support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources
of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or
partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single
part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated
America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential
establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance
certain kinds of naval stores -- tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood
for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting
texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy
might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of
signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national
economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater
plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from
the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or
maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more
than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of
a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not
only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to
foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be
replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free
circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will
have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of
different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or
unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The
variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation
contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted
upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value
than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising from
the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of markets.
Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and
unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can
scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter
predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would be
less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The
speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these
observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the
commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable
than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or
disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them
which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,
interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the
course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,
as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of
government.
There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of
a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the
regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper
discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our
interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American
affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be
divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests.
Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her
negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended
her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively
felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted
her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the
rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound
philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a
physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and
with them the human species, degenerate in America -- that even dogs
cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.[1] Facts
have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It
belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach
that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it.
Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans
disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen
States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in
erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all
transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the
connection between the old and the new world!
PUBLIUS
"Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."
____
FEDERALIST No. 12
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, November 27, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have
been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of
revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares. By multipying the means of
gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make
them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant,
the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious
manufacturer, -- all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation
and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils. The
often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from
indubitable experience, received a decision which has silenced the
rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the
satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately
blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries that, in
proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how
could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent
for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the
cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing
the quantity of money in a state -- could that, in fine, which is the
faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment
that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of
the objects upon which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so
simple a truth should ever have had an adversary; and it is one, among a
multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of
too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the
plainest truths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a
great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the
celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these
objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and
facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary
dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,
cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is
situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory
are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from
the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can boast
but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe
obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the
preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the
strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be
seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of
view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It
is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people,
from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is
impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.
Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the
collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been
uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained
empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of
popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident
to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every
experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the
different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of
Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more
tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable,
than in America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is
derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises.
Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter
description.
In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill
brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets
of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty
supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and
lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to
be laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency of
taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will
best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best
adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious
doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general
Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce,
so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from
that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for
the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must
serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more
productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to
increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which
they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores; the facility
of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and
manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; -- all these are
circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between
them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions
of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States or
confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the
temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The
temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit
those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the
avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water;
and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the
adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly
employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the
dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these
patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty
in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland
communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which
the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by
disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to
each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The
arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily
armed, would be intolerable in a free country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the
States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but ONE
SIDE to guard -- the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from
foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to
hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would
attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would
have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well
after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination.
An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of
any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed
vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a
small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government
having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere, the
co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful
tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by
Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be
relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great distance
from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places with
which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade. The
passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as
between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring
nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a
direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to
one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe.
The difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect
importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small
parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the additional
facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every man of
discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,
further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any
partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted,
that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three
per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent.,
and in Britain they exceed this proportion.[1] There seems to be nothing
to hinder their being increased in this country to at least treble their
present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal
regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a
ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported
into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons;
which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred thousand
pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should
tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally
favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the
health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of
national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of
the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist
without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign
its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.
This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede.
Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the
principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their
true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the
people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor,
indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture,
are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very
ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before
remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to
large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption. In
populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion
the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the
State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the
eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State,
nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of
other resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the
possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the
government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources
of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under
such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its
respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the
consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that
valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the cultivation of
the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each other
in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the infatuation of those
counsels which led to disunion.
PUBLIUS
1. If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.
____
FEDERALIST No. 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, November 28, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider
that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied
to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the
pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government,
there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are
divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different
national civil lists to be provided for -- and each of them, as to the
principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary
for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into
thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too
replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who
speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned
toward three confederacies -- one consisting of the four Northern,
another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States.
There is little probability that there would be a greater number.
According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an
extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No
well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy
can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its
organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the
convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain
magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms
of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule
by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the
government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that
the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed
confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we
reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of
so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt
that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same
task in a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and
exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and
can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a
judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more
probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the
alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical
and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and
prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in
case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two
governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the
links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be
expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise
enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that
confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her
accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a
frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do
there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even
Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league.
An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own navigation, is her
true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her
citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not
think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation.
They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations
to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.
Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so
adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier, she may
deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned
towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the
stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the
fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be
the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes
New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the
south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able
to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or
any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight
in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on
the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to
take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on
mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we
take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to
guard the inland communication between the different confederacies
against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of
the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military
establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the
jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States
would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be
not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce,
revenue, and liberty of every part.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 14
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Answered
From the New York Packet.
Friday, November 30, 1787.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign
danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of
our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for
those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the
Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which
have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming
symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this
branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be
drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few
observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived
that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of
the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of
republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary
difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in
vain to find.
The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has
been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that
it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from
the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was
also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the
people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they
assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A
democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic
may be extended over a large region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some
celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the
modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an
absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the
advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in
comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as
specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and
modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to
transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only; and
among others, the observation that it can never be established but among
a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular
governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no
example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same
time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering
this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which
the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force
directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim
the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive
republics. It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should
wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full
efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her
consideration.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central
point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as
often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater
number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a
republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the
representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the
administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the
United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who
recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that
during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States
have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the
most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of
attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting
subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The
limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,
on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the
Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the
forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude.
Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees,
it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles; computing it
from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four
miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be
eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance
from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven
hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of
several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system
commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal
larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is
continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment,
where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power.
Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as
it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the
island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required
of those of the most remote parts of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is
not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern
all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the
separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can
extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately
provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it
proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the
particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their
objection; though it would not be difficult to show that if they were
abolished the general government would be compelled, by the principle of
self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the
federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive
States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other
States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods,
which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that
may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which
lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further
discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout
the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere
be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers
will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern
side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent
of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and
Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be
rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the
beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds
it so little difficult to connect and complete.
A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every
State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in
regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake
of the general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest
distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course, may partake
least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same
time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently
stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and
resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our
western or northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the
seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone
against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of
those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual
danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in
some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater
benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will
be maintained throughout.
I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never
suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however
fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into
the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion
would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you
that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords
of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family;
can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness;
can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and
flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you
that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty
in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the
theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is
impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this
unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it
conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American
citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their
sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be
shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild
of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us
in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness.
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely
because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people
of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions
of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind
veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own
situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly
spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for
the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American
theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no
important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a
precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an
exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States
might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of
misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of
some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human
race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a
revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the
globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is
incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works
betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred
most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to
be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of
your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate
and to decide.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 15
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, December 1, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow
citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the
importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have
unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed,
should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America
together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy
or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I
propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will
receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto
unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in
some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that
you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which
can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which
you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of
the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which
sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles
from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without
sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of
the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the
"insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the
Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof
to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted, to
which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent, and
which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the
friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged that,
however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to
harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material
imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to
be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this
opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at
length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal
share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a
reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of
our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted
by the intelligent friends of the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound
the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do
not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are
held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of
constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to
our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the
preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper
or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable
territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power
which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been
surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our
interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent
or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.[1] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,
ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a
free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes
us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public
danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and
irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at
the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign
powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad
are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural
decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price
of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be
accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be
fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are
so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct
tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the
friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to
borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this
still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of
money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither
pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what indication
is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could
befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we
are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those
very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the
proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us
to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss
that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that
ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for
our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at
last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths
of felicity and prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be
resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national system;
but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries
of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy,
upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While
they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of
energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are
requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things
repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority,
without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union,
and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to
cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in
imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the
Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience
do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from
fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main
pillars of the fabric.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the
rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States
has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but
they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the
individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though
in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice
they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at
their option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that
after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,
there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for
deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and
which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a
principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must
substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild
influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or
alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place,
circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and
depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts
of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early
part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for
this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly
hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to
establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the
world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and
quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before
they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to
mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no
other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose
general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any
immediate interest or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a
similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,
and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated
under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,
consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate
government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and
defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and
enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,
nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we
still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is
the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a
common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those
ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic
difference between a league and a government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, -- the only
proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea
of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a
penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed
to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws
will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.
This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by
the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force;
by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first
kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity,
be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is
evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of
the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be
denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences
can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association where
the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the
communities, that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a
state of war; and military execution must become the only instrument of
civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the
name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his
happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the
regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a
sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present
day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the
same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times
betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is
actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of
civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of
this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of
mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to
reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action
is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.
A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the
deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom
they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would
blush in a private capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an
impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the
exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to
restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in
every political association which is formed upon the principle of
uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there
will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or
inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual
effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not
difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the
persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the
particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with
perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to
execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse
of this results from the constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will
be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the
respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or
not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or
required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary
conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this
will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,
without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state,
which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong
predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead
the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which
the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the
councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the
ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been
conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how
difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of
circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important
points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a
number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other,
at different times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate
in the same views and pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign
wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete
execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.
It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the
Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,
step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at
length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and
brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely
possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till
the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute
for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come
to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been
specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate
degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The
greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example
and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least
delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those
who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should
we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden?
These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand,
and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote
consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,
yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or
convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail
and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to
crush us beneath its ruins.
PUBLIUS
1. "I mean for the Union."
____
FEDERALIST No. 16
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 4, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities,
in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the
experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which
have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we
have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those
systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and
particular examination. I shall content myself with barely observing
here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has
handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there
remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters
of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best
deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of
political writers.
This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled
the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the
members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that
whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the
immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.
It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its
application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there
should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national
government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when
this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the
Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the
strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it
consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general
authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed
would be confined to a single member, and if there were more than one
who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them
to unite for common defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if
a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing member,
it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some
of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the
common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the
deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented to
alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the
good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any
violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take
place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected
sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers,
with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of
personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable
they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent
States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had
to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to
encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of
which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the
passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of
wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to
carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to
any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of
submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a
dissolution of the Union.
This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more
natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if
the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form.
It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the
complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the
Union by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would
always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves
upon an equal footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of
their example. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of
all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in
its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in
ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the article
of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source of
delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had
proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretense of the latter
would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its
fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh
expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as
often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of
factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that
happened to prevail in the national council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to
prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the
instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the
ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the
plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of
extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable
at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it
will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union
would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to
confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would the
means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance.
Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these
States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they
will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once
dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their
movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities,
and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same
capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the
monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and
demi-gods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller
than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign
States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual.
It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker
members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and
disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of
the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half.
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly
this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal
government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the
general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to
its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the
opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the
persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate
legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the
ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the
national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts
of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must
be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of
individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the
strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all
the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing
the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised
by the government of the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should
be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time
obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same
issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is
reproached.
The pausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to
the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and
ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State legislatures be
necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT
TO ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect
of duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, so
as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people
for the safety of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make a
merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some
temporary convenience, exemption, or advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not
require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass
into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular
governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and
violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions nor evasions
would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner
as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights.
An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a
constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people
enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an
illegal usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not
merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of
the courts of justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were
not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce
the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of
the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted
with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as the natural
guardians of the Constitution, would throw their weight into the
national scale and give it a decided preponderancy in the contest.
Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity or rashness,
because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors, unless
in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority.
If opposition to the national government should arise from the
disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be
overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same
evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being equally the
ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source it might emanate,
would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the local
regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness. As to those
partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet society,
from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, or from sudden or
occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of the community
the general government could command more extensive resources for the
suppression of disturbances of that kind than would be in the power of
any single member. And as to those mortal feuds which, in certain
conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through
a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of
discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some violent
popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of
calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and
dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid
or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too
mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object
to a government because it could not perform impossibilities.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 17
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 5, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and
answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the
principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may
be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too
powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which
it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.
Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable
man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation
the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government
could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that
description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State
appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce,
finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which
have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers
necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in
the national depository. The administration of private justice between
the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of
other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which
are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be
desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable
that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp
the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to
exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory;
and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to
the dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national
government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and
lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still
it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the
national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several
States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It
will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon
the national authorities than for the national government to encroach
upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the
greater degree of influence which the State governments if they
administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally
possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches
us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal
constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their
organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the
principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments
would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national
government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the
attention of the State administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly
weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon
the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the
people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their
local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the
force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better
administration of the latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under
the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so
many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society,
cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and
uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear
and satisfactory light, -- I mean the ordinary administration of
criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful,
most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and
attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian
of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant
activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests
and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more
immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to
impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and
reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which
will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular
governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure
them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render
them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling
less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the
benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by
speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less
apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less
likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active
sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the
experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted,
and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of
association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose
authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate
vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to
them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied
and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the
persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of
sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this
situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign, and
frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves.
The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to
preserve the public peace, or to protect the people against the
oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is
emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper
and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and
influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular
authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that
of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown
off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or
States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over
his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those
vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the
enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were
dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest
effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had
the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity
and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them
and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the
abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture.
Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland
will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an
early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their
dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the
aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the
incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit,
and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational
and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in
the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the
feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the
reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence
and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be
able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government.
It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and
necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship
of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions
of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one
case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal
of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an
inattention to which has been the great source of our political
mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This
review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 18
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the New York Packet.
Friday, December 7, 1787
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of
the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From
the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a
very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American
States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states,
and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general
authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the
common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the
last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the
aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against
the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the
guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple
of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies
between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a
further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an
oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the
violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious
despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they
exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The
Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the
principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a
declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were
bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.
Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The
powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by
deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities;
and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the
disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more
powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination,
tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from
Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The
Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent
period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of
domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of
the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that
judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and
Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of
them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The
intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes
convulsions, and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out
of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The
Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by
such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public
deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece
of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition
and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and
degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by
the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around
the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of
primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the
peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to
establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and
Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired,
became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more
mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies,
fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war;
which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had
begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal
dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from
abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground
belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according
to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious
offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to
submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook
to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated
god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of
Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly
seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned
against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over
to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their
influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and
by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this
interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious
observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and
persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of
Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian
republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser,
than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though
not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved
it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction,
appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The
senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right
of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into
treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as
he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and
consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in
the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations,
when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two
praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was
preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same
weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect
proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in
uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled
to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into
the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the
institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the
Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member,
left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation.
This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius
of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this
curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular
operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown
by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like
experiments with which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take
notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of
the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon,
there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the
administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in
the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY
all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations
on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous
elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic,
BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE
CONFEDERACY.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a
certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due
subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is
sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans,
which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on
the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the
latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the
successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The
arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was
seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the
cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that
of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression
erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their
example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting
off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole
Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal
dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and
seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in
Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal
damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the
league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as
successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy
was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition
to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as
an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian
princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes,
or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter
expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a
pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their
affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished.
The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and
powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most
abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the
exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon,
soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
Achaeans, though weakenened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of
Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and
Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves,
though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had
recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign
arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it.
Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the
league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans
fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary
instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to
nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of
those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal
liberty[1] throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now
seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the
violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union,
the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into
pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of
Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with
chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important
portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and
because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it
emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to
anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head.
PUBLIUS
1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the
members on the federal head.
____
FEDERALIST No. 19
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, December 8, 1787
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not
exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There
are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit
particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the
Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven
distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the
number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has
taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike
monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany
became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took
place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and
independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed
the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But
the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who
composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished,
gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and
independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to
restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and
tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied
with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different
princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the
public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the
anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last
emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the
Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full
sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and
decorations of power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important
features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which
constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet
representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor,
who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the
diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary
tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the
empire, or which happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of
making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops
and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new
members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by
which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his
possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly
restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from
imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the
consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from
doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat
to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such
as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as
such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and
in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them
are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative
its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to
fill vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not
injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public
revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain
cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he
possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for
his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities,
constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and
head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must
form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred
systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental
principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of
sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the
laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body,
incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external
dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the
princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of
the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of
foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and
money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce
them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation,
involving the innocent with the guilty; of general inbecility,
confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on
his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one
of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near
being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia
was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly
proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members
themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with
the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of
Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the
emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with
the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated,
and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign
powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic
constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the
necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military
preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising
from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of
sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the
enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take
it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in
time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local
prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate
contributions to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among
these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire
into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior
organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the
laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has
only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the
constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of
this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions,
or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war.
Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the
mischief which they were instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a
sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the
circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which
had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public
occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The
consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and
the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an
appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps
of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had
secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on
the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered
from his territory,[1] he took possession of it in his own name,
disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his
domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine
from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of
most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy
of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members,
compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and
influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary
dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which
his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first
prince in Europe; -- these causes support a feeble and precarious Union;
whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and
which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever,
founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this
obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a
revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and
preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long
considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in
this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy
of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local
sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof
more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions.
Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at
the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to
disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the
stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common
coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical
position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear
of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by
the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and
homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent
possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing
insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often
required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and
permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. The
provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges
out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an
umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces
definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The
competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their
treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges
himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to
employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with
that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended
to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary
cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up,
capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the
subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and
bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The
Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets,
where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left
the general diet little other business than to take care of the common
bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It
produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head
of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of
Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.
PUBLIUS
1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says
the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.
____
FEDERALIST No. 20
The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 11, 1787.
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of
aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the
lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each
state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In
all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be
unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces.
They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one
years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances;
to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain
quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity
and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have
authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and
alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on
imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the
provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories.
The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from
entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to
others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own
subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges
of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an
hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic
are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial
estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates
of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in
the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial
quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain
regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in
the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between
the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations
of the States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give
audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular
affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for
garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all
appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts
of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and
directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval affairs;
presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints
lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of war,
whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred
thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about
forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated
on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon
it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign
influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar
calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his
countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the
vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an
authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony,
but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different
from the theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain
contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be
executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot
pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of
the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces
to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to
obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are
frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of
the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be
ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable,
though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of the members exceeds in
force all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate
resistance; but utterly impracticable in one composed of members,
several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and
equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign
minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the
provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by
these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and
notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to
overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty
of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in
1648, by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized,
was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the
last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of
unanimity was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily
terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation
of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when
once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the
dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment.
Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power,
called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than
out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has
been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces,
the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have
dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union
could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within
themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them
to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is
remarked by Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the
stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew
the others into a sort of dependence, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency
to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute
necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they
nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the
republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices,
and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY
ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As many
times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC
COUNCILS in reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of
the existing constitution. Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one
moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with
the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their
adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an
ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has
distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries and
failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions,
from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of
foreign arms, the crisis of their distiny. All nations have their eyes
fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is,
that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their
government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of
tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The next, that the asylum under
which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be
secured in this country, may receive and console them for the
catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these
federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its
responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The
important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case,
is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a
legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as
it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order
and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or
the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary
COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 21
Other Defects of the Present Confederation
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 12, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal
circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of
other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of
the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our
hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and
satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary
that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the
disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the
total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now
composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to
their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or
divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is
no express delegation of authority to them to use force against
delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the
federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact between
the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of
that part of the second article, by which it is declared, "that each
State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." There is,
doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind
does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing
that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or
explaining away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of
the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of
which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible
animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the
force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that
the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government
destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have
been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands
discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and
exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind
declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty
from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure
from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of
coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it
might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately
attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its
laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may
rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the
people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than
behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful
faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no
succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends
and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which
Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind
are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the
issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a
Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism,
established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New
Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an
objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as
involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal
advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a
misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no
impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the
people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain
undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be
effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this
kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the
stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the
precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the
government is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretense for
the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the
State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in
the community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the
common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the
Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national
exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared
from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it now solely with
a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to
contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national
wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer
by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of
lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been successively
proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to being
a just representative. If we compare the wealth of the United
Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we
at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate
population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands
and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the
three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is
no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and
that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were
to be run between several of the American States, it would furnish a
like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,
Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall
be convinced that the respective abilities of those States, in relation
to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in
lands or to their comparative population. The position may be equally
illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State.
No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the
active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion to that
of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the
total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a
criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of
the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information
they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these
circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to
admit of a particular specification, occasion differences hardly
conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries.
The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of
national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which
the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt,
therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy
by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and
extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the
eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance
with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not
long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the
public burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to
impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of
others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight
they were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable
from the principle of quotas and requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own
way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of
consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its
level with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by
each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated
by an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor
can be frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a
judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If
inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular
objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by
proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other
objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it
is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established
everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would neither
be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so
odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from
quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they
contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe
their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end
proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this
object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, "in political
arithmetic, two and two do not always make four." If duties are too
high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the
product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within
proper and moderate bounds. This forms a complete barrier against any
material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is
itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect
taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue
raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally
relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment.
Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a
standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country
have been considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a
rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the view of simplicity and
certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a
herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a country
imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are
increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate
valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of
taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be
found in the nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not
incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences
than to leave that discretion altogether at large.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 22
The Same Subject Continued
(Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 14, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal
system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in
rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of
the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be
of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under
the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from
the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be
added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view,
that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or
finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want
of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial
treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction
between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our
political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations
with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any
importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the
part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and
while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage
they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as
their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be
wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a
bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries,
should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions
in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce
of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan
until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not
to acquire greater consistency.[1]
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions,
and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this
particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general
authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has
hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to
do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue
to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to
the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just
cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would
be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of
animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intcrcourse
between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the
German empire[2] is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the
duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises
passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams
and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are
rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this
country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to
us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State
regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be
considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of
foreigners and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions
upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the
late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an
economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the
States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the
quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an
enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase
afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to
procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for
any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the
most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an
unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to
their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the
perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive
expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced,
and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the
people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and
vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near
the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made
efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities;
while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss
as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure
of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions
of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States
which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged
with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the
deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much
reason to reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little
prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to
make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and
requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view,
a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice
among the members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable
part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of
fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to
Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts,
or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the
national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North
Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican
government, which requires that the sense of the majority should
prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a
majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated
America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the
plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this
majority of States is a small minority of the people of America;[3]
and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded,
upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties,
to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third.
The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving
the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due
importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible
to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It
is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last.
The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare
depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not
relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two
thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important
resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always
comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the
impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal
dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of
fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a
majority of the people;[4] and it is constitutionally possible that
these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable
moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning
which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of
the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to
interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be
observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of
States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of
votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in
reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority
(which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater
number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few
States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a
single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A
sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware
and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to
its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has
an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The
necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching
towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute
to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration,
to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure,
caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto,
to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In
those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the
weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance,
there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in
some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control
the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it,
the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the
views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will
overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national
proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue;
contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system,
it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some
occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures
of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is
often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the
necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation
must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives
greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction,
than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the
contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not
attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by
obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When
the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the
doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is
safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget
how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the
power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping
affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to
stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one
foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation
demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek
the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making
separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would
evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up
the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the
votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would
suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number;
in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much
easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our
councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may
be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might
have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our
forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a
connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of
the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that
they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary
monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his
ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the
external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to
give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the
state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this
species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens
of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence
and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to
any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to
exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to
overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes
us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign
corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed to the
ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is
well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various
instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms.
The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to
his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must
depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies.
And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England
in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust
in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch
in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition,
became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet
to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter
without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by
judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations,
they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.
And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which
forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable.
If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as
many different final determinations on the same point as there are
courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often
see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing
from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result
from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent
judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court
paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of
civil justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so
compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened
by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are
invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the
contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be
much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the
interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was
to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the
particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for
nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar
deference towards that authority to which they owe their official
existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as
many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority
of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole
Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the
passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is
it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a
government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer
consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so
precarious a foundation?
In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the
exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those
imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power
intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered
abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who
can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions,
that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of
amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and
characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise
of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A
single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather
fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the
federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of
good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even
the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution
admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be
adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand
the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of
personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be,
that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers
upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from
the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in
spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive
augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we
shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of
the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever
contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the
adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be,
solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing
federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting
on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it
has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the
validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the
enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its
ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same
authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a
heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to
revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates.
The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of
laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the
mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,
original fountain of all legitimate authority.
PUBLIUS
1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on
introducing the last bill.
2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire."
3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States,
but they do not contain one third of the people.
4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be
less than a majority.
____
FEDERALIST No. 23
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
the Preservation of the Union
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 18, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one
proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the
examination of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches -- the
objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of
power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon
whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will
more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these -- the common
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well
against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of
commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence
of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government
of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These
powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE
CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO
SATISFY THEM. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are
infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power
ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such
circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils
which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind,
carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot
be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple
as they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END;
the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected,
ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care
of the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for
discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will
follow, that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers
requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown
that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible
within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position
can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a
necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority
which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in
any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to
the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it;
though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.
Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and
money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their
requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are
in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies
required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States
should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the
"common defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of
their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would
be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of
the members to the federal head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was
ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last
head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and
discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in
the first principles of the system; that if we are in earnest about
giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project
of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must
extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of
America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and
requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all
this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy
troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will
be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the
customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the
essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate
the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the
different provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most
ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge.
Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are
fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government
of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all
regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in
respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction
is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the
citizens of the same State the proper department of the local
governments? These must possess all the authorities which are connected
with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their
particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree
of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious
rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great
interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them
with vigor and success.
Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as
that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided;
which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and
urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the
WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of
every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned
to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper
exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the
States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and
measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a
manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care
of the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the
EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of
co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And will not
weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities
of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its
natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal
experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have
just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,
will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny
the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects
which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most
vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled
in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the
requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered to our
consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to
answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the
constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers
which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an
unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE
can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely
accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the
subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention
ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal
structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy
of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into
inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the
powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal
administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL
INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they
are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been
insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty
arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country
will not permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can
safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views,
and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move
within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually
stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the
most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the
authorities which are indispensible to their proper and efficient
management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly
embrace a rational alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot
be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been
advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations
which have been made in the course of these papers have served to place
the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter still in
the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This, at all
events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the
extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an
energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the
Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who
oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our
political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which
predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire
limits of the present Confederacy.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 24
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 19, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in
respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met
with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is
this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of
standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now
endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,
supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;
without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to
the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America,
as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietory of
this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection
under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the
LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military
establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our
State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the
present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported
by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:
either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies
should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE
the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in
any shape, to the control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised
to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the
whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the
EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of
the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead
of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was
to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even
of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the
appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period
than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear
to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without
evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be
apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say
to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic
declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that
this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding
models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the
most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which,
in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several
State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that
TWO ONLY of them[1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in
time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound
silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of
the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible
foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to
imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it
was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated
either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a
zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him,
that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in
the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would
expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe
to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit
provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a
departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the
discontent which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the
articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased,
but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery,
that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked
for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the
authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed
a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a
man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer
refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a
sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to
receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their
country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been
tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in
which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America
as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has
even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on
the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and
would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of
millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and
entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right
determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a
conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to
mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince
them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view
of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that
restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military
establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if
imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be
observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there
are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence
or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are
growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other
side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and
establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the
vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create
between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation
to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier
ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies,
because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The
improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of
communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors.
Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A
future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded
as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day
diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain.
And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood
as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These
circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in
considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier.
No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it
should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians.
These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from
the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The
first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The
militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their
occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times
of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to
do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the
loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of
individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be
as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private
citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the
government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,
indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of
the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional
interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the
matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may
be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military
establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be
exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and
encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier
garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements
might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the
possession of which will include the command of large districts of
territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be
added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian
nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a
situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two
neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert
all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To
this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense
of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has
become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its
fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but
where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons
will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against
descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and
sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS
1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of
State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which
contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is,
in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of
rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF
THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the
Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says
not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the
constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their
constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two
States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but
that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this
respect.
____
FEDERALIST No. 25
The Same Subject Continued
(The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 21, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the
direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of
the primary principle of our political association, as it would in
practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head
to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States,
dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union
from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is
therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like
manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury.
It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly
exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate
provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the
establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or
ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as
it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various
inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it
might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little
able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of
competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the
parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the resources of
such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be
proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm
at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or
three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They
would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily
be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by
mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper
size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be
engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the
Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in
any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people
will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition
to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be
stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military
forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility
to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the
constitutional authority of the Union. On the other hand, the liberty of
the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which
left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far
as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had
better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be
jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For
it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the
people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights
are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least
suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to
the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,
have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or
troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the
existence of a federal government and military establishments under
State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due
supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and
requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which
the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national
legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which
has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,
though we have never been informed how far it is designed the
prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to
KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to
the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be
ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what
shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation?
Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be
continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised
continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF
PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once
to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce
an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the
continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the
national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue,
that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger,
might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them
on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community
was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion
so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of
the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on
the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination
between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation.
Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate
pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain
or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired
appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased
again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a
combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by
a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from
whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution
of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States
would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has
yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare
for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an
enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to
the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the
State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return
it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger,
and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the
genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our
weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid
that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might
endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its
preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its
natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national
defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our
independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been
saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of
this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a
suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and
disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the
same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and
vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the
late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal
monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the
liberty of their country could not have been established by their
efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most
other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by
perserverance, by time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced
course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant,
affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of
that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in
a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one
or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in
all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of
danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a
lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State
(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the
Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic
insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the
spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed
no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct
us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under
those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in
time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is
therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative
discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States,
how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected,
even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the
rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public
necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the
post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The
Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from
the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in
that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to
gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to
their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of
investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal
title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude
that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and
illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little
regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run
counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious
about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be
observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,
though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a
country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of
necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, December 22, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the
minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary
boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this
delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences
we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we
may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change
after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change
for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of
providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which
owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We
have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive
prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first
appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by
which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the others have
refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence
must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in
the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard the
abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger
the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative
authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this
respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught by
experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may
have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others
still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are
calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which,
upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be
affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles
they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the
popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for
any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to
be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be
argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not
wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater
energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the
community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may
arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages
and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those
habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the
inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of
the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the
prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by
the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions
became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which
elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that
English liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined
power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles
II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of
5,000 regular troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who
were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the
exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill
of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF
PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no
security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite,
beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere
authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that
memorable revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of
any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a
certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable;
that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a
power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the
government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to
the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point
of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived
an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in
time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular
rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the
degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The
attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the
legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number
of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of
the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess
extended to the representatives of the people in their popular
assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not
adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not
to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE.
I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a
similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to
any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,
under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside
anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was
superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done
without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it.
Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that
of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both in
Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government
established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace,
the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up,
but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity
of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy
and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at
all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be
unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be
interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made
to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let
the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What
then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to
operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new
Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military
purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much,
is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an
imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper
provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and
powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of
keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the
point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the
face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the
executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they
were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a
confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be
expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt,
persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the
measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the
support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public
attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in
opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the
proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have
an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of
parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of
discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only
vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the
citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will
constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national
rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to
sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if
necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;
which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the
legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of
time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it
probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through
all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial
elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that
every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House
of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to
his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man,
discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest
enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions
can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated
authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves
into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be
able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It
would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to
so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason
could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations
of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long
deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors,
would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be
unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large
enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that
very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the
acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what
pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in
time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of
some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not
within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so
visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be
raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of
the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have
an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those
calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot
be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even
result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever
be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common
defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than
in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil
altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy
to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the
whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our
liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the
aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted
upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion
(as has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this
supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 27
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
the Common Defense Considered)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, December 25, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind
proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military
force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that
have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion,
unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons
upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the
latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a
presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of
federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any
exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the
distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground
there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we
presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will
be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to
be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition
in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that
their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be
proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must
be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions
depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered
as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a
constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and
maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to
induce a probability that the general government will be better
administered than the particular governments; the principal of which
reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a
greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the
medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and
which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason
to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care
and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and
more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will
be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the
reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and
propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the
public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the
community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary
inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction,
and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to
fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more
critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited
to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory
reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal
government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it
odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable
foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with
any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other
methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular
members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of
punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the
government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power,
can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy,
be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the
LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the
resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily
suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in
that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a
match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just,
there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of
individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single
member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less
just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the
operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary
exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet
with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it
is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it
enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put
in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will
be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of
the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely
strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his
mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly
be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is,
that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens
towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension
to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less
occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and
comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those
channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow,
the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients
of compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the
one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using
force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents;
the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their
political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a
Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that
frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the
very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they
can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will
enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the
execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to
destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources
from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the
same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is
enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on
public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its
having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the
whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws
of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance
of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each
State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures,
courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated
into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.[1] Any man who will pursue, by his own
reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that
there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution
of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common
share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may
deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is
certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the
best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and
precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the
adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the
national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to
the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of
ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a
conduct?
PUBLIUS
1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to
the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its
proper place, be fully detected.
____
FEDERALIST No. 28
The Same Subject Continued
(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
the Common Defense Considered)
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, December 26, 1787
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be
necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience
has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations;
that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies,
however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily,
maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions
from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the
simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible
principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of
those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of
experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed
must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a
slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue
would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is
that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may
be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to
the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the
citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the
insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice
conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were
irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a
principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might
become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that
Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of
her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure.
Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost
jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for
success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone?
Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more
regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be
admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the
militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the
State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the
national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising
that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should
urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with
tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as
it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil
society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to
the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the
continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one
general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be
formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of
either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the
same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to
the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in
a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition,
be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the
case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is
equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have
one government for all the States, or different governments for
different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make
use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the
peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws
against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections
and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full
answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military
establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the
proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security
for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in
civil society.[1]
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is
then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of
self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and
which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted
with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the
rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons
intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels,
subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct
government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The
citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without
system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The
usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush
the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the
more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic
plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early
efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their
preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of
the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the
opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar
coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase
with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand
their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of
the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial
strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course
more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to
establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without
exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate.
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either
scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to
themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national
authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so
likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the
people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information.
They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the
organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at
once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all
the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each
other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the
protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it
would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of
ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be
able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have
it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages
obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in
others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was
left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all
events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to
come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means
of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the
community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that
the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of
erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense
empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State
governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the
celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? The
apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be
found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
PUBLIUS
1. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
____
FEDERALIST No. 29
Concerning the Militia
From the New York Packet.
Wednesday, January 9, 1788
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in
times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties
of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal
peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in
the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with
the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for
the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the
camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage
of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them
much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions
which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity
can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to
the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most
evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower
the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE
APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA
ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan
of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been
expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this
particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be
the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be
under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is
constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies
are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the
body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as
far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such
unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid
of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the
employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of
the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army
unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence
than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is
nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the
POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty,
whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his
only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which
have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much
calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair
dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath,
that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and
unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient
even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as
much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd
to doubt, that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of
the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of
those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws
necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would
involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of
landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to
it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power
to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it,
in its application to the authority of the federal government over the
militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be
to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of
authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when
necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of
sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between
charity and conviction?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are
even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of
the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the
views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia
may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen.
But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who
object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and
were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature
from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold
to him, in substance, the following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as
futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried
into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a
business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a
week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great
body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be
under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and
evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of
perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated
militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public
inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon
the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole
expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a
thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so
considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made,
could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can
reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to
have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be
not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in
the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the
utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible,
be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of
the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a
select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit
them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it
will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia,
ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require
it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but
if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an
army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties
of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at
all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready
to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This
appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing
army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from
the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and
perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is
a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to
treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere
trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous
artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring
of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our
fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors,
our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are
daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate
with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What
reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the
Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its
services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the
SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always
secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is
apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance,
which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind
nothing but frightful and distorted shapes --
"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable
suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for
the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of
Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch
are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one
moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the
people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from
their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy
of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an
equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic
Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art
or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the
people of America for infallible truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,
what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the
militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and
hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery
upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of
the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a
project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to
make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed
people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a
numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the
detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do
they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober
admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they
the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If
we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would
employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper
that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another,
to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence
of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the
first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is,
indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of
affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be
no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a
neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of
self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 28, 1787.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to
possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces;
in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any
wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are
not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect
to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a
provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of
the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in
general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of
the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven,
in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one
shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body
politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to
perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to
procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of
the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular,
one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to
continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying
the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and,
in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other
respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has
no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the
bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy;
and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need,
to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a
like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a
state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that
the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by
competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which
the necessities of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the
United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants
of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been
done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention.
Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already
been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money
necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and
their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in
every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no
right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that
of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But
though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of
such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though
it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it
has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as
the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the
intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system
have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in
our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of
these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us
to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to
ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the
system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive
system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined
for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national
government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation
authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government?
Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human
ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the
inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective
supplies of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force
of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction
between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they
would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain
into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they
declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This
distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound
policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its
OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of
tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor
or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be,
alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking
into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan
of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance
of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the
establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we
could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon
the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities.
Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon
the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision
for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may
be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN
THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY
STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the
States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be
depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices
and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated
in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to
trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its
inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to
enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between
the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves.
Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in
this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been
supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will
be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to
answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the
distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of
truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in
the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to
say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying
the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or
anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always
necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide
for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of
the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability,
dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can
its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients
temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a
frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it
undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very
first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for
argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers
the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace
establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What
would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency?
Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the
success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of
fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would
it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already
appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It
is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it
should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of
public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the
public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be
dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern
system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to
large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this
necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government
that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated
that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for
paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in
their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon
the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and
fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of
the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the
case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess
an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to
quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the
resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into
activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever
deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own
authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its
necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of
America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but
to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other
governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its
situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not
often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and
little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to
see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous
age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common
portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot
of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such
men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful
solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might,
with too much facility, inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 31
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, January 1, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.
These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection
or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not
this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the
organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or
passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that
"the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal
to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other
maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a
cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every
power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be
no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself
incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter
sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms,
are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves,
and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased
mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those
pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the
human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more
simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which,
however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance
with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of
philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE
DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of
a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed
among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense
than any of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of
infidelity have been so industriously leveled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less
tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should
be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against
error and imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far,
and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though
it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political
knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of
the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than,
to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be
disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions
and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many
occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding
to some untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound
themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in
their opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the
necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the Union,
should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment?
Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will
perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory
to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to
them. They are in substance as follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the
full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the
complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from
every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of
the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the
public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision
for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned,
the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than
the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the
national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that
article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of
providing for those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective
capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an
unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude
that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national
government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these
propositions, unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations.
But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution,
so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their
principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may
therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they
combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in
substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of
the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying
taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of
the local administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are
at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the
people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State governments should
be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the
national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the
wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER
might, and probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of
providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to
the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to
become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all
laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities
with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at
any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense
of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing
this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all
the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of
federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State
governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of
usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be
designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its
intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted
to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into
conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into
an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all
reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered
amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which
side to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has
so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the
powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible
dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may
bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution. I
repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place, that all
observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred
to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or
extent of its powers. The State governments, by their original
constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our
security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the
manner of their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to
administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the
federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be
such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all
apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments
to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a
disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State
governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict,
must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ
toward insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side
of the people, and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that
the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them,
the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to
the disadvantage of the Union; and that there is greater probability of
encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal
head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this
kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the
safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention
wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in
the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence
and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their
own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the
constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State
governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will
not be difficult to obviate the objections which have been made to an
indefinite power of taxation in the United States.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 32
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
From the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, January 2, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the
consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from
a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I
am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of
provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of
the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes,
would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power;
yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the
reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an
independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for
the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that
(with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would,
under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most
absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the
national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a
violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its
Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and
whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on
the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which
were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,
would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms
granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States
from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to
the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be
absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to
distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble
it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the
exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional
interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but would
not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of
constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances:
The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article
provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION"
over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This
answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers
Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises"; and
the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares
that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of executing its
inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to
lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception
mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares
that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State;
in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES
ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in
that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish
an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This
must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to
prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is
in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under
consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other
than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent
and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States.
There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that
power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence
which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being
the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be
deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on
imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it
were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and
it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the
authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would
be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if
the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the
exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular,
there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous,
because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which
has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be
just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases
to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of
taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what
lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and
an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States to
impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their
authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere
sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the
imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to
lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The
restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not,
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to
understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then
be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd
conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national
legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax
every other article, UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the
intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged
to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general
power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have
been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the
kind.
As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the
States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which
would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed,
possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State
which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid
on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a
constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the
imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either
side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be
involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of the
national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not
exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not,
however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers,
but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication
alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from
the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities,
of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union,
remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that
division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument
which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find
that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities,
there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed
improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to
insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States.
The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such
provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the
convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of
the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every
hypothesis to the contrary.
PUBLIUS
____
FEDERALIST No. 33
The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
From the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, January 2, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution
in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last
clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under
consideration authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws
which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE
POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof"; and the second clause
of the sixth article declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States made IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by
their authority shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of m